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2.1  Introduction 
Do existing tax rules cause the volume of  outbound foreign direct invest- 
ment (FDI) from the United States to be excessive in the sense that a decrease 
in the current level of such investments would raise the present value of U.S. 
national income? The evidence discussed in this paper suggests the opposite is 
true. The present value of  the repatriated dividends and interest that would 
result from an additional dollar of  outbound FDI would  exceed the present 
value of  the income that would result from a one dollar increase in domes- 
tic investment in  business plant and equipment.'  Thus, even if  each dollar 
of  outbound FDI displaces a dollar of  domestic investment, an incremental 
expansion of  outbound FDI would raise the present value of  U.S. national 
income. 
It is, of course, widely recognized that much of U.S. outbound FDI allows 
parent firms to earn especially high rates of return based on their existing pat- 
ents, technical know-how, brand names, and other assets that cannot be fully 
exploited by producing at home and exporting or by licensing to foreign firms. 
The relevant economic question is therefore not about the desirability of out- 
bound FDI as a whole, but about the appropriate extent of  such investment. 
Critics argue that the existing US.  tax rules induce firms to increase their over- 
seas direct investment to a point at which the national return to the United 
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States on that investment is less than the national return on an additional dollar 
of domestic investment.* 
The analysis that leads to that conclusion can be summarized as f01lows:~ 
U.S. parent firms receive a tax credit in the United States for the taxes paid by 
foreign subsidiaries to foreign governments (up to the tax rate that would be 
paid to the U.S. government on those profits). Since the parent firm is indiffer- 
ent between paying taxes to foreign governments and to the U.S. government, 
the parent expands foreign subsidiary investment to the point at which the 
after-tax return to the firm is the same abroad and at home. Because the after- 
tax return abroad is the total return to the United States while the pretax return 
on domestic investment is the total return to the United States, the U.S. national 
return on the last dollar of outbound FDI is less than the national return on the 
last dollar of domestic investment. Equating the national returns on both types 
of investment requires replacing the credit for foreign taxes with a deduction 
(which treats foreign taxes paid like any other business expen~e).~ 
This widely accepted argument is wrong because it ignores the combined 
impact of debt finance and the imperfect integration of the world capital mar- 
ket. The evidence summarized below indicates that the FDI of  U.S. multina- 
tional firms causes those firms to borrow more from foreign sources than they 
otherwise would. Because the after-tax cost of that capital is less than the after- 
tax return on the investments made abroad, the parent firm gains a net advan- 
tage. Unlike domestic borrowing in the United States (which just  shifts the 
income among the providers of debt and equity capital and the government), 
this foreign borrowing represents a transfer from the fixed income investors 
(lenders) in the foreign country to the United States. With the actual prevailing 
patterns of finance and tax rates, the net advantage of foreign borrowing ex- 
ceeds the disadvantage of paying taxes to the foreign government. The esti- 
mates described below indicate that FDI at the margin leads to a stream of net 
interest and dividend receipts to the United States with a present value of more 
than $1.72 for every dollar of outbound direct in~estment.~ 
Although this net advantage could in principle be achieved by international 
2. This argument is quite separate from the popular debate about whether outbound FDI reduces 
employment in the United States because it substitutes for domestic production and exporting or 
increases employment in the United States because parent firms export to their foreign subsidi- 
aries. Economists recognize that this is a misplaced concern because the American labor market 
works well in assuring that all who want jobs at wages that reflect their skills can find work within 
a relatively short time. See Graham and Krugman 1991 and Lipsey 1995. 
3. This argument, first presented in Richman 1963 and Musgrave 1969 and later formalized in 
Dutton 1982, has been widely accepted in tax-policy discussions (e.g., U.S. Congress, Joint Com- 
mittee on Taxation 1991). 
4.  The use of a foreign tax credit is sometimes justified as a way of maximizing the global return 
to capital, that is, inducing firms to expand outbound FDI  until the pretax return is the same in all 
countries. Horst (1980) shows that this issue is more complicated when the saving rate reflects the 
after-tax return on investment. 
5. This present value is calculated at  12 percent, the real rate of return assumed to be earned 
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portfolio investment without any FDI, the very imperfect integration of  the 
world capital market means that this does not happen in practice. Section 2.2 
discusses the nature of the imperfect global capital market integration and the 
way in which FDI circumvents the limited net movement of portfolio capital. 
Section 2.3 deals more explicitly with the effect of FDI on the level of domes- 
tic investment, and section 2.4  discusses the effect of such investment on the 
use of foreign debt and equity capital by American multinational corporations. 
The implications of this for the present value of the dividend and interest pay- 
ments that are generated by outbound FDI are presented in section 2.5. There 
is a very brief concluding section. 
2.2  The Limited Integration of World Capital Markets and 
the Circumventing Effect of FDI 
If the national capital markets around the globe were fully integrated into a 
single global capital market, a dollar of additional saving in any country would 
flow to the investment anywhere in the world that offered the highest rate of 
return, regardless of national boundaries. There is, however, strong and robust 
evidence that this does not happen. Despite the large volume of gross interna- 
tional capital flows, there is very little net capital flow. Saving generated in any 
country tends to stay in that country. 
The evidence on this “home bias” in international capital markets indicates 
that a sustained increase in the ratio of  domestic savings to gross domestic 
product (GDP) causes a sustained increase in domestic investment that is ap- 
proximately 80 percent to 90 percent as large. This 80 percent to 90 percent 
“saving retention ratio” has been confirmed many times since it was first pre- 
sented by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and has been shown to be robust with 
respect to the time period, the estimation method, and the subsample of coun- 
tries.6  This conclusion, based on cross-country studies of decade average sav- 
ing and investment rates, is consistent with detailed microeconomic evidence 
showing that only a very small fraction of the portfolios of  large institutions 
are invested abroad. Moreover, only about 3 percent of the total U.S. private 
financial wealth of  $9.4 trillion at the end of  1991 was  invested in foreign 
stocks and bonds. 
This segmentation of the global capital market implies that an international 
flow of portfolio funds or bank loans does not automatically equalize the return 
on investments in different countries or the cost of funds to borrowers in dif- 
ferent countries. It also has important implications for the impact of FDI. In a 
perfectly integrated world capital market, an incremental dollar of capital out- 
flow from the United States in the form of FDI might be offset by  a net inflow 
6.  See, for example, the papers by Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991) and Frankel (1985,  1991). 
Mussa  and  Goldstein  (1993)  present  an  excellent  summary  and  interpretation  of  this  liter- 
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of  an additional dollar of  portfolio capital, leaving domestic investment un- 
changed. The evidence summarized in the next section indicates that this does 
not happen in practice. An increase in outbound FDI appears to increase the 
outflow of domestic saving to the rest of the world. 
A second way that FDI circumvents the segmentation of global capital mar- 
kets is through the local financing of the foreign subsidiary. The evidence sum- 
marized in section 2.4 shows that the subsidiaries of U.S. multinational compa- 
nies use substantially more foreign-source debt than domestic U.S. companies 
do. Although this does not cause a cross-border flow of  capital, it does give 
U.S. equity investors an opportunity to use more foreign debt capital than they 
would without the outbound FDI. The importance of this for the national return 
on outbound FDI is discussed in section 2.5. 
2.3  The Effect of Outbound FDI on Domestic Investment 
To understand the likely effect of outbound FDI on the aggregate volume of 
domestic investment, it is useful to begin with an analysis of the behavior of 
an individual multinational firm and then to consider the broader general equi- 
librium response of the capital market to the action of the firm. 
A simplified version of corporate capital budgeting shows how a firm’s deci- 
sion to invest abroad could cause an equal reduction in its domestic investment. 
The company starts with a given projected level of  after-tax profits for the 
current year. The management pays a current dividend based on the past level 
of dividends and shareholders’ expectations about the link between dividends 
and reported earnings. The amount of retained earnings that remains after that 
dividepd and the company’s desired ratio of debt to capital together determine 
the amount that the company can borrow during the current year and there- 
fore the firm’s total funds available for capital investments. The company could 
supplement these funds by  new equity issues or divestitures or could absorb 
some of these funds by share repurchases, but such transactions are unusual 
events rather than a part of the annual capital budgeting process. This capital 
budgeting process is carried out at the level of the corporation as a whole and 
not for the parent company or for any of the subsidiaries alone. Any portion of 
the total capital budget that is used for one investment reduces the funds avail- 
able for other investments. In particular, an increase in the total amount of 
overseas investment reduces the amount of capital available for domestic in- 
vestment within the firm by an equal amount. 
Such a reduction in domestic investment within a single firm that makes an 
overseas direct investment does not imply anything about the effect of aggre- 
gate outbound FDI on the aggregate level of domestic investment within the 
U.S. economy as a whole. For example, the domestic investment opportunity 
that the firm forgoes because it invests abroad might be undertaken by another 
firm that would otherwise have invested those funds abroad. But when the en- 
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FDI will reduce domestic investment by  an equal amount if  all firms use the 
type of capital budgeting process described above. 
It is possible, however, that this description of the capital budgeting process 
is too restrictive. A sustained rise in total national outbound FDI could in prin- 
ciple leave domestic investment opportunities that induce firms to raise their 
debt-to-capital ratio with the additional funds coming from abroad. In other 
words, the increase in outbound FDI would induce an offsetting inflow of port- 
folio capital. The effect of  outbound FDI on total domestic investment thus 
depends on the extent to which portfolio capital is internationally mobile. 
To assess this, I have extended the earlier Feldstein-Horioka (1980) analysis 
of investment in the major industrial countries of  the Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development. To  do so, I have estimated regression 
equations with decade average ratios of gross domestic investment to GDP as 
the dependent variable and with the gross national saving ratio (GNS/GDP) 
and the FDI ratios (FDI-out/GDP and FDI-in/GDP) as the key  explanatory 
variables. Other control variables that are likely to influence the investment 
rate and to be correlated with the FDI-out/GDP ratio are also included in the 
equation: the absolute size of  the economy, an indication of  whether it is a 
European country, the rate of real economic growth, the rate of inflation, and 
the rate of interest. The estimated coefficient of the ratio of FDI-out to GDP in 
such an equation is about -  1 (varying between -0.80  and -  1.59 according 
to the decade of the data and the specific control variables included) and with 
large enough standard errors that in every case it is not significantly different 
from -  1  ? This indicates that each dollar of outbound FDI displaces approxi- 
mately one dollar of domestic investment, a result that is consistent with the 
view that the Feldstein-Horioka capital market segmentation applies to port- 
folio capital and that FDI achieves a net cross-border flow of capital equal to 
the amount of the FDI. 
2.4  The Effect of Outbound FDI on the Use of Foreign Capital 
The cross-border capital flow that was discussed in the previous section rep- 
resents only a small part of the total financing of the foreign affiliates of U.S. 
multinationals. The Commerce Department’s U.  S. Direct Investment Abroad: 
1989 Benchmark Survey (1992) found that among majority-owned nonbank 
affiliates of  U.S. nonbank companies only about 20 percent of  the value of 
assets owned abroad is financed by cross-border flows from the United States. 
An additional 18 percent represents retained earnings attributable to U.S. par- 
ents. The remaining 62 percent is financed locally by foreign debt and equity, 
of which foreign debt is about 53 percent and foreign equity is the remaining 
9 percent.8 
7. The specific estimates are presented in table 2.3 of Feldstein 1995. 
8. More details on this capital are presented in section 1 of Feldstein 1994. 18  Martin Feldstein 
This use of foreign capital is far greater than it would be for additional do- 
mestic investments, perhaps reflecting a greater willingness of  foreign banks 
and other lenders to provide credit to local subsidiaries of U.S. firms that have 
local assets as implicit collateral. In addition, the parent firm may use foreign 
debt to hedge the effect of currency fluctuations on the value of reported over- 
seas earnings. The multinational parent may also use local borrowing as a way 
to reduce expropriation risk. Whatever the reason, it is clear that U.S. firms 
borrow much more foreign funds when they have direct investments abroad. 
In this way,  the flow of FDI also overcomes the apparent segmentation of the 
global capital market. 
2.5  The Present Value of Dividends and Interest per Dollar of FDI 
The preceding analysis indicates the information needed to assess the im- 
pact on the United States of an incremental dollar of U.S. outbound FDI. Con- 
sider a firm for which the real pretax rate of return on an incremental invest- 
ment in the United States would be 12 percent. If  the tax rate faced by  the 
firm’s foreign affiliate is the same as the U.S. tax rate and the leverage used 
abroad is the same as the leverage at home, the firm will invest until the mar- 
ginal pretax return on the foreign investment is also 12 percent. 
From the point of view of the United States as a whole, there are two funda- 
mental differences between the firm’s domestic and foreign investment. First, 
the foreign investment will be taxed by the government of the foreign country, 
so that the entire 12 percent pretax return does not flow to the United States. 
In contrast, the tax collected on the firm’s investment in the United States re- 
mains U.S. national income. Second, the borrowing by the foreign affiliate at 
an after-tax cost that is substantially  less than the real return on capital confers 
a net benefit to the United States. In contrast, when the firm borrows domesti- 
cally to finance the alternative domestic investment, the gap between the return 
on capital and the net cost of borrowing is simply a redistribution among 
equity owners, lenders, and the government with no net impact on U.S. na- 
tional income. 
The net impact of these two countervailing forces can be evaluated by esti- 
mating the present value of  the dividends and interest (net of  future lending 
from the United States) that would be paid to U.S. suppliers of capital on the 
incremental foreign investment. The present value of U.S. national income is 
increased by  the incremental FDI if  the present value of  these flows, when 
discounted at the 12 percent real rate of return that would have been earned on 
the displaced U.S. investment, exceeds the initial value of  the displaced in- 
vestment. 
In Feldstein (1994) I estimate this stream of dividends and interest (net of 
future lending from the United States)  for a foreign investment  with a financing 
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described in section 2.4 above. More specifically, each dollar of initial assets 
abroad is  financed with  a  mix  of  U.S.  and  foreign equity and  debt. The 
U.S. investors provide 70 percent of the equity and 8 percent of the debt, essen- 
tially the ratios implied by  the U.S.  Direct Investment Abroad: 1989 Bench- 
mark Survey. The debt finance equals 50 percent of  the total capital invest- 
ment. Annual  dividends are  equal to  70 percent  of  after-tax  profits. The 
remaining retained earnings are leveraged with an equal amount of debt, with 
8 percent of that incremental debt coming from U.S. sources and 92 percent 
coming from foreign sources. The interest rate is 8 percent, and inflation is 
4 percent. 
The present value of  the net interest and dividends paid to U.S. investors 
that are generated by this process is $1.72 per dollar of initial U.S. debt and 
equity investment when discounted at a 12 percent real discount rate? Even 
with the conservative assumption that each dollar of  cross-border FDI dis- 
places a full dollar of domestic investment and that all of that investment would 
have earned the 12 percent available on additions to the business capital stock 
(rather than the lower return available on owner-occupied housing), this calcu- 
lation implies that each dollar of  outbound FDI raises the present value of 
U.S. national income by  nearly twice as much as the value of the displaced 
investment. Measured in a different way, the assumptions described in the pre- 
vious paragraph imply that the U.S. cross-border investment earns an internal 
rate of return for the United States of 15.1 percent. 
2.6  Concluding Remarks 
It is clearafrom the analysis in this paper that the credit for foreign taxes paid 
does not induce U.S. firms to expand FDI to a point at which the return to the 
United States on such investments is less than the return on the displaced do- 
mestic investment. A typical marginal FDI (which has the same net return to an 
American multinational parent as an alternative marginal domestic investment) 
actually has a higher return to the United States than the domestic investment 
that it displaces. 
A rule for taxing FDI to maximize the present value of U.S. national income 
would certainly not replace the current foreign tax credit with a deduction for 
foreign taxes. It would instead move in the opposite direction from the current 
tax rule in order to encourage more FDI,  particularly investments that employ 
substantial foreign debt per dollar of U.S. capital. 
9. The net flow to the United States is the interest and dividends received minus the additional 
lending from U.S. sources. The analysis assumes that the incremental lending from U.S.  sources 
continues to  be 8 percent of the affiliate’s total debt. 20  Martin Feldstein 
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